Israel's War of Independence (1947-1949)
In human terms, the War of Independence was Israel's costliest war, with over 6,000 Israelis were killed and 15,000 wounded. The war consisted of 39 separate operations, fought from the borders of Lebanon to the Sinai Peninsula and Eilat.
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Israel's War of Independence (1947-1949)
In human terms, the War of Independence was Israel's costliest war, with over 6,000 Israelis were killed and 15,000 wounded. The war consisted of 39 separate operations, fought from the borders of Lebanon to the Sinai Peninsula and Eilat.
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Israeli soldiers view Syrian tank destroyed at Kibbutz Degania (Photo: GPO)
In December 1946 - at the first post-war Zionist Congress in Basle - David Ben Gurion assumed the defense portfolio, including responsibility for the Haganah, which at the time concentrated on the struggle against the British.
Although British restrictions, searches and detentions made the building of a clandestine force - with armor and artillery, air and sea power - well-nigh impossible, Ben-Gurion decided early on that this was the decisive task: to build up a force in preparation for an assault by the regular armies of the Arab countries, which the yishuv would have to face alone, without outside help.
He found the Haganah woefully ill prepared for such an eventuality and set about energetically to rectify this. Since import and deployment of heavy weapons were not practicable as long as the British held sway over Palestine, it was decided that manpower should be readied in the country and equipment purchased abroad - to be "married" in time to throw back an Arab assault, if not to prevent it; in time for 15 May 1948, the day envisaged for the termination of the British Mandate and the day after Israel would declare its independence.
The War of Independence (1947-49)
The war was fought along the entire, long border of the country: against Lebanon and Syria in the north; Iraq and Transjordan - renamed Jordan during the war - in the east; Egypt, assisted by contingents from the Sudan - in the south; and Palestinians and volunteers from Arab countries in the interior of the country.
It was the bloodiest of Israel's wars. It cost 6,373 killed in action (from pre-state days until 20 July 1949) almost 1% of the yishuv (the Jewish community) - although that figure includes quite a number of new immigrants and some foreign volunteers.
In the First Phase (29 November 1947 - 1 April 1948), it was the Palestinian Arabs who took the offensive, with the help of volunteers from neighboring countries; the yishuv had little success in limiting the war - it suffered severe casualties and disruption of passage along most of the major highways.
In the Second Phase (1 April - 15 May) the Haganah took the initiative, and in six weeks was able to turn the tables - capturing, inter alia, the Arab sections of Tiberias, Haifa and later also Safed and Acre, temporarily opening the road to Jerusalem and gaining control of much of the territory alotted to the Jewish State under the UN Resolution.
The Third Phase (15 May - 19 July), considered the critical one, opened with the simultaneous, coordinated assault on the fledgling state by five regular Arab armies from neighboring countries, with an overwhelming superiority of heavy equipment - armor, artillery and airforce.
On 31 May the Haganah was renamed the "Israel Defence Forces". The IDF suffered initial setbacks, including the loss of the Etzion Bloc in Judea, the area of Mishmar Hayarden in the north and Yad Mordehai in the south, but after three weeks was able to halt the offensive, to stabilize the front and even initiate some local offensive operations.
The Fourth Phase (19 July 1948 - 20 July, 1949) was characterized by Israeli initiatives: Operation Yoav, in October, cleared the road to the Negev, culminating in the capture of Be'er Sheva; Operation Hiram, at the end of October, resulted in the capture of the Upper Galilee; Operation Horev in December 1948 and Operation Uvda in March 1949, completed the capture of the Negev, which had been alotted to the Jewish State by the United Nations.
Simultaneously, the Arab countries signed Armistice Agreements: first came Egypt - 24 February 1949; followed by Lebanon - 23 March; Jordan - 3 April; and Syria - 20 July. Only Iraq did not sign an armistice agreement with Israel. It preferred to withdraw its troops and hand over its sector to the Arab Legion of Jordan.
In the end Israel not only ejected the invading Arab forces - it also captured and held some 5,000 km2 over and above the areas allocated to it by the United Nations.
In the middle of the War of Independence, the IDF was born, not on 15 May, but two weeks later; for two more weeks Ben-Gurion negotiated with the "dissident" armed organizations, the Etzel and Lehi, convincing them to disband voluntarily before he disbanded them in the Order of the Establishment of the IDF on 31 May 1948. That order provided for only one armed force, subordinate to the constitutional government. There was complete continuity between the Haganah and the IDF: Ya'acov Dori, the Chief of Staff; the members of the General Staff; the commanders from brigade-level downwards - all were automatically confirmed in their appointments.
At the end of the war the IDF had over 100,000 full-time men and women in uniform, as compared to the mere handful of full-time soldiers at its beginning. In addition to 12 brigades, mostly infantry, it had several regiments of artillery. The first armored regiments were equipped with light armored vehicles, some captured, some "requisitioned" from the departing British troops; and a few tanks - two Cromwells "bought" from the withdrawing British and some reconstituted from American scrap.
The Navy consisted at first of reconverted illegal immigrant vessels. There were the elements of an Air Force - Spitfires and Messerschmidts, acquired mainly in Czechoslovakia, in addition to the light civilian planes which the Haganah had used for reconnaissance and communications purposes. Some World War II US war surplus bombers were bought as scrap. These carried out their first "strategic attack" on Cairo, en route to Israel, even before reaching their homebase. Armed with a Baedeker tourist guide, one of them bombed and strafed Abdeen Palace: rudimentary, to be sure, but entirely unexpected and, therefore, psychologically effective.
As soon as the armistice agreements were signed and the immediate danger had passed, the IDF - except for a small nucleus - was not only demobilized, but effectively disbanded. The new state had urgent tasks which required all its resources, above all that of absorbing the flood of new immigrants, who at last were able to come "home". An attempt to keep the demobilized soldiers in some sort of reserve framework failed. However, for the time being there was little inclination on the Arab side to renew full-scale fighting. Not that they had come to face reality and recognized Israel - far from it; but they did realize that to fight against Israel required thorough preparation.
In the meantime they found what was considered a perfect tool to show their own people that the war was not over yet and at the same time both to harrass Israel and embarrass her. Palestinian fedayun (suicide troops) infiltrated across the long and ill-protected border - and it should be recalled that no place in Israel was far from the border: infiltrations for the purpose of stealing farm equipment were followed by the laying of mines, the killing of individuals, and wholesale massacres. The fedayun were trained, equipped and paid for by Egyptian Intelligence, although they operated mainly from bases in Jordan, so that Jordan would bear the brunt of Israel's retaliation, which inevitably followed. And each time Israel retaliated, the Security Council condemned it; condemnation of an Arab government had long since become an impossibility, because of the Soviet veto.
The infiltrations - however painful, militarily and diplomatically - were no more than a diversion from the main concern of the IDF: preparations for the second round.
Yigael Yadin, who had taken over from Ya'akov Dori as Chief of the General Staff, devoted his energy to organizing the reserves and streamlining the command structure - elements of which remain in effect to this day. At the same time, particular attention was paid to the development of armor. Israel's numerical inferiority to its neighbors and potential enemies; its realization that because of the lack of strategic depth it was bound to transfer fighting as soon as possible to enemy territory and its proven advantage at swift, often improvised manoeuvers - all pointed to the need for armor. The newly found alliance with France at the time of the Suez crisis provided the unique opportunity to equip a major part of the IDF with French-made tanks. This "miracle" occurred at a moment of desperation, when no other country, East or West, was willing to supply Israel with arms, whereas countries from both East and West rushed to offer their wares to the Arabs. Particularly worrisome was the Czech- Egyptian arms deal, which threatened Israel with a whole range of state-of-the-art Russian hardware.
The Gulf War (1991)
In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and threatened to attack Israel with various types of weapons, including non-conventional ordnance. For the first time in Israel's history, the entire country faced a real threat of destruction.
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The Lebanon War: Operation Peace for Galilee (1982)
A ceasefire with Palestinian terrorists in Lebanon declared in July 1981 was broken:terrorists continued to carry out attacks against Israeli targets. On June 6, 1982, the IDF launched Operation Peace for the Galilee.
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The Second Lebanon War (2006)
12 Jul 2006On July 12, 2006 eight IDF soldiers were killed and two kidnapped on the border with Lebanon, in an attack by the Hizbullah terror organization.
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The Sinai Campaign (Operation Kadesh - 1956)
The Sinai Campaign was fought to put an end to to the terrorist incursions into Israel and to remove the Egyptian blockade of Eilat.
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The Sinai Campaign (Operation Kadesh - 1956)
The Sinai Campaign was fought to put an end to to the terrorist incursions into Israel and to remove the Egyptian blockade of Eilat.
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Israeli tanks moving across the Sinai peninsula
The Sinai Campaign, fought to put an end to terrorist incursions into Israel and to remove the Egyptian blockade of Eilat, marked the final transformation of the IDF into a professional army capable of large-scale operations. A battle plan for the operation was adopted in early October 1956, but was revised following Israel's secret agreement with Britain and France. Under this agreement, Israel would transfer the focus of action as close to the Suez Canal as possible.
On its own account, the Israeli government also drew up a course of action allowing it to convert the operation into a brief raid, should the British and French, contrary to the secret agreement, not intervene. In a new plan, adopted on October 25, it was decided to launch the operation with a paratroop landing, and to hold the Armored Corps back until October 31.
At 17:00 on October 29, Israeli units parachuted into the eastern approaches of the Mitla Pass near the Canal - a political rather than tactical or strategic objective. The action provided the pretext for a French and British ultimatum to Israel and Egypt, calling on both sides to cease hostilities and withdraw from the Canal area. For diversionary reasons, Israeli forces also advanced on southern and central axes.
The following day, October 30, Britain and France issued the planned ultimatum, but to no effect, as heavy fighting between Egyptian and Israeli units persisted. In a swift, sweeping operation of 100 hours, under the leadership of then Chief of the General Staff, Moshe Dayan, the entire Sinai peninsula fell into Israeli hands, at a cost of 231 soldiers killed. Reserve units, about which many misgivings had been uttered before the war, conducted themselves honorably. A reserve brigade, equipped with requisitioned civilian buses, negotiated the difficult desert track and captured Sharm e-Sheikh at the southernmost tip of the Sinai peninsula.
The Sinai Campaign did not so much introduce new principles and policies as reaffirm the direction the IDF had already taken. Above all, the doctrine that the determining factors in Israel's mode of warfare would be the Armored Corps and the Air Force was confirmed. The Air Force was still deficient; its development was one of the lessons learned from that war; armor had proven its ability and was there to stay. If 1948 was undoubtedly the War of the Infantry, the uncontested queen of the battlefield in the war of 1956 was Armor.
Once more Israel gained a breathing space of about ten years. Attention now turned to the north, where the Syrians - since 1953 - had been attempting to thwart Israel's National Water Project. Having failed, they undertook to divert the headwaters of the Jordan (originating in Syria), by a manouever designed to leave Israel high and dry. Water is a classical reason for war in the Middle East; but a brief, resolute employment of artillery and tanks prevailed on the Syrians to refrain from their spiteful exercise.
Although Israel had been compelled to withdraw from Sinai without any security guarantee, UNEF - the United Nations Emergency Force, was established to guard against a recurrence of past events. As a result, the fedayun ceased to exist. On the other hand, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), was reorganized and its principal military arm, the Fatah - one of a confusing array of para-military and terrorist organizations - began operations on 1 January 1965, at first from across the Lebanese border. Never an existential threat to Israel, it was a constant nuisance from there on and a temptation to divert attention and energy from the main task, preparations for yet another round.
The Six-Day War (June 1967)
Within the brief span of six days, the IDF overran the Sinai peninsula; took the entire West Bank of the River Jordan; and captured a great part of the Golan Heights. The culminating event was the capture of the Old City of Jerusalem.
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The Six-Day War (June 1967)
Within the brief span of six days, the IDF overran the Sinai peninsula; took the entire West Bank of the River Jordan; and captured a great part of the Golan Heights. The culminating event was the capture of the Old City of Jerusalem.
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Paratroopers at the Western Wall in Jerusalem, June 1967 (GPO/D. Rubinger)
The year 1967 began with confident predictions that it would not bring war. Nasser, it was argued in Israel, had learned the lesson of 1956 and would not start a war unless he was ready. In any case, his relations with Jordan were notoriously bad and a coalition between Nasser and King Hussein was out of the question.
In quick succession, events gave the lie to these predictions. A clash in the air, in which Syria - Russia's closest ally in the Middle East - lost 13 planes, provided the opening signal. As a result of Soviet prodding, Nasser mobilized and sent 100,000 troops to Sinai. He demanded that the Secretary General of the United Nations withdraw UNEF forthwith, and - probably to his own surprise - succeeded immediately and the "firemen" departed. Then Nasser announced the closing of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping (May 23) - a clearcut casus belli. He ended by taunting Yitzhak Rabin, Israel's Chief of Staff: "Let him come, I'm waiting."
Meanwhile he succeeded in bringing about close coordination with the Syrian army. King Hussein, in an abrupt about-face, flew to Egypt and signed an agreement placing his forces under overall Egyptian comand. It was to cost him half his kingdom.
Israel, its reserves fully mobilized, its nerves taut to the snapping point, waited for three long weeks. The situation seemed the reverse of 1956; Israel was alone, against a powerful Arab coalition. The Big Powers, vague promises notwithstanding, did nothing to reopen the Straits and Israel decided to go it alone.
On 5 June 1967 a cluster of planes flying from Egypt to Israel was seen on King Hussein's radar screen. Convinced by the Egyptians that the planes were theirs, he promptly gave the order to attack - in Jerusalem! In fact the planes were Israel's, returning from their devastating attack against the Egyptian airforce, which surprisingly had been taken by surprise; after taunting Rabin, Egypt was not ready when he came.
Within the brief span of six days, the IDF overran the whole Sinai peninsula, up to the Suez Canal; took the entire West Bank of the River Jordan; and in the last days, without the benefit of surprise, captured a great part of the Golan Heights, including the dominant Mount Hermon - from then on "the eyes and ears of Israel". The culminating event was the capture of the Old City of Jerusalem and the re-encounter with the place most revered by Jews, the Western (Wailing) Wall. The blowing of the shofar at the Western Wall reverberated throughout the world.
776 Israeli soldiers fell in the Six-Day War.
Whilst all branches of the service had performed well, the Air Force had, for the first time, played a decisive role: clearing the skies at the outset made all that followed possible. This was the War of the Air Force.
Diplomatic efforts to bring to an end the by-now 40 years of conflict, which predated the establishment of Israel by more than two decades, came to nought. In November 1967, after months of deliberations, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 242, calling for peace and recognition of the "right of every nation to live free from threat within secure and recognized boundaries", in return for Israel's withdrawal "from territories", not "all the territories", nor "the territories captured in the course of the recent hostilities". However, the Arab League, in its session in the Sudan (1967) adopted a different resolution, the "Three No's" of Khartoum: No peace, No negotiations, No recognition of Israel.
The War of Attrition (1968-70)
Following the Six-Day War, a static exchange of artillery fire along the entire Bar Lev line on the Suez Canal, escalated into the War of Attrition.
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The Yom Kippur War (October 1973)
The war, which started on the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, the Day of Atonement, was the fiercest Arab-Israeli war since the 1948 War of Independence. Egypt and Syria attacked Israel, catching Israel off guard.
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The Yom Kippur War (October 1973)
The war, which started on the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, the Day of Atonement, was the fiercest Arab-Israeli war since the 1948 War of Independence. Egypt and Syria attacked Israel, catching Israel off guard.
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Long range guns firing at Syrian targets on the northern front (Photo: GPO)
The war was so called because it started on the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, the Day of Atonement (October 6, 1973). It came almost as a complete surprise and warning notice was given too late for an orderly call-up of the reserves before zero hour.
The Egyptians and the Syrians made some significant initial gains: the former crossed the Suez Canal and established themselves along its entire length on the east bank; the latter overran the Golan Heights and came within sight of the Sea of Galilee. However, the wheel turned very quickly. Counterattacking swiftly, sometimes even foolhardily, within a few days the IDF was on the west bank of the Suez Canal, at a distance of 100 kms from the Egyptian capital, Cairo, and within artillery range of the airfields around the Syrian capital, Damascus.
Egypt, which at first had refused a cease-fire, now accepted it avidly, as did Syria. Considering the adverse initial circumstances, the speed and the thoroughness with which the IDF had been able to reverse its fortunes was remarkable. Yet the Yom Kippur War went down in Israel's history as a qualified failure. The surprise rankled; and the cost was heavy: 2,688 soldiers fell.
Intelligence was faulted for failing to sound the alarm in time - the Chief of Staff, David (Dado) Elazar and his Chief of Intelligence had to resign. Too many airplanes were lost to Russian-made SAM-missiles. Some experts reached the sweeping conclusion that the tank had seen its day, in view of its vulnerability to Sagger missiles and infantry-operated RPGs. Of 265 Israeli tanks in the first echelon, only 100 survived.
The branch that distinguished itself during the Yom Kippur War was the Navy, which only now came of age: without a single loss of its own, it had sunk 34 enemy vessels; had secured the coasts of the country; and had succeeded in restricting the enemy to his bases. This was indeed the Navy's War.
The IDF deterrent capacity had been weakened as a result of the war. It was, however, partially restored in a spectacular and successful operation: the Entebbe Raid of 1976 - renamed Operation Jonathan, after the young commander of the ground forces who was its only military casualty. The Jewish and Israeli passengers of a hijacked Air France liner - carefully selected by the hijackers - were rescued from the hands of a German group of terrorists, in far-away Uganda. The resourcefulness and daring of the operation - down to transportation by plane of a black Mercedes of the sort used by Uganda's dictator, to confuse the enemy - aroused the imagination of the world.
The Yom Kippur War was followed by a series of Separation-of-Forces Agreements with Egypt and Syria. These envisaged a strip of territory in which no troops would be allowed, backed by another strip, where the presence of troops was carefully restricted.
The agreement with Syria is still in force and UNDOF, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, is still there to supervise its implementation. The agreement with Egypt has been replaced - after lengthy negotiations which began with the dramatic visit to Jerusalem of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat (November 1977) - by the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979, the first to be signed between Israel and one, the most important, of its Arab neighbors. It was based on the withdrawal of Israel from the whole of the Sinai peninsula and its demilitarization in return for full recognition of Israel by Egypt and establishment of embassies and full trade and tourist relations.
The Palestinian terrorist organisations again came to the fore. They were able to establish their bases in Lebanon. Not that Lebanon was more hostile to Israel than other Arab countries, on the contrary; but the central government of Lebanon was too weak to prevent the establishment of "a state within a state". After a particularly bloody terrorist raid on two civilian passenger buses travelling on the coastal road near Tel Aviv, which resulted in 37 killed and 76 wounded (March 1978), the IDF undertook a swift operation: Operation Litani (March 1978) against terrorist bases in Lebanon. Its impact, however, did not last very long.
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